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James F. Byrnes' Yalta Rhetoric
BERNARD

K.

DUFFY

Clemson University
James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt's "Assistant President for the home
front," was annointed to international politics during the fateful Yalta
Conference. Byrnes' experience prior to Yalta had been primarily as a
domestic politician. His participation in the Yalta Conference identified
him with matters of state beyond proportion to his actual experience and
made him a credible candidate for Secretary of State in the Truman administration. If Yalta was crucial to Byrnes' political career, it was equally
important to the way Roosevelt was perceived during the Cold War years.
Brynes' reputation and the memory of Franklin Roosevelt were both shaped
by the South Carolinian's public statements about Yalta.
Byrnes' initial pronouncements on Yalta came just one day after the intentionally terse and ambiguous Yalta communique was issued by the Big
Three. Roosevelt, who would not return from Yalta by ship until more than
two weeks after the Conference closed, asked Byrnes to fly home first. He
authorized Byrnes to hold the first White House press briefing on the Conference, thereby making him its official interpreter.' During the hour-long
press conference Byrnes reported to the national media interpretations of
Yalta which shaped a view of the agreements distorted by incompleteness
and inaccuracy. Both during the press briefing and after he became
Truman's Secretary of State, Byrnes contributed to the forging of the myths of
Yalta which later fueled the fires of anti-Roosevelt, anti-New Deal sentiment.
An examination of Byrnes' public portrayal of Yalta immediately after
the Conference and later as Secretary of State reveals the extent of public
credulity during a time of national crisis, the effective transfer of Byrnes'
credibility to a subject about which he knew little, and Byrnes' lack of
political responsibility. It shows how the complex and interlocked motives
of Roosevelt and Byrnes resulted in a contradictory rhetoric which,
although initially favorable to Roosevelt's interest in seeing the accords approved, eventually armed his critics who asserted that the terminally ill,
journey-weary President secretly sold out United States interests to Stalin.
In all of this Byrnes' initial press conference was influential. To an extent, the distortions and omissions in Byrnes's statements to the press stemmed
from Roosevelt's tactic of keeping him blissfully ignorant of some of the
most important agreements, especially those dealing with concessions made
to the Soviet Union in the Far East.2 Since Byrnes left Yalta at Roosevelt's
request before the final session in which the Far East was discussed, he was
unaware of these agreements. Roosevelt was not, however, solely responsible for the inaccuracies in Byrnes' story. Byrnes understood clearly that his
mission was to act as the President's representative. No matter how im61

complete his understanding of Yalta may have been, he realized that an optimistic interpretation of the accords would win congressional and public
support. Roosevelt simply made it easier for Byrnes to be optimistic. Many
of the distortions were clearly Byrnes' own fault. In the press conference he
lent personal interpretations to the Conference communique which the
events of the Yalta Conference simply do not confirm. Upon becoming
Truman's Secretary of State, Byrnes' participation in the selling of Yalta
constituted a political liability which he shed through false implications of
Roosevelt's secret Yalta diplomacy.
Roosevelt invited Byrnes to attend the Yalta Conference largely
because of his political influence with Congress. Byrnes devoted the first
portion of his press conference to refuting this very idea, thus conditioning
the press to perceive his account as credible. He told the press he had gone
to Yalta to render advice on domestic economic matters as the Director of
War Mobilization. "All day long," Byrnes recalled, "I found questions
arising, no matter where the conference was held. And whoever represents
the government should have someone who knows something about the
government generally, or he is at a great disadvantage in a conference with
nations who have made government a profession and a career." Byrnes
maintained he had left the conference early for no other reason than that his
work was concluded. 3 His interest in appearing to be more than a political
functionary merged conveniently with Roosevelt's interest in having an apparently objective public advocate.
Byrnes' obvious sensitivity to this issue may also have stemmed from
the criticism he received from the Washington Post for leaving his domestic
post to join the Yalta mission. In his 1958 autobiography Byrnes made
much of the fact that he went to the Conference reluctantly, and only
because his staff urged him. • Despite Byrnes' perceptions of his role as an
important adviser to the President, it seems unlikely that as a domestic
politician he could have played a leading part in a foreign policy conference.
The truth lies elsewhere. Roosevelt's motive for taking Byrnes was
primarily or entirely political. Byrnes enjoyed considerable stature with
Congress, the public, and the press. As a former United States Senator,
Supreme Court Justice, and current Director of War Mobilization, essentially the "Assistant President for the home front," Byrnes' reputation
made him an ideal liaison with Congress and a public advocate for Yalta.
Not only was Byrnes influential, he was also not perceived as a Roosevelt
yes-man. Roosevelt had passed over Byrnes in favor of Truman for his Vice
Presidential running-mate, this after Byrnes had resigned his Supreme
Court seat to work in the Roosevelt administration. 5 These palpable
realities more than Byrnes' insistence that he was an economic rather than a
political adviser helped mightily to establish his ethos as a credible reporter.
By having Byrnes on hand in Washington to explain the Yalta communique the day after it was issued, Roosevelt hoped to placate the
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American press and Congressional leaders who had complained bitterly of
excessive censorship. Even before the Conference began, the New York
Times had moaned: "Will there be a break from the practices of the past
and will we get real explanations from American sources or will we have to
wait until Mr. Churchill finds it timely to report to the Commons." 6 Congressional Republicans like Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, also expressed concern that Roosevelt would
not publicly air the Yalta discussions and would, as in the past, circumvent
Congress. Vandenberg's publicly acclaimed speech, "The Need for Honest
Candor," essentially a plea for Congressional involvement in foreign afand public disclosure of future talks, documents the aggravation of many
congressmen.7 Congress and the American news media had grown wearily
accustomed to receiving their information from foreign sources and anticipated with pique that their sole source of information about Yalta would
be a closely written communique. Indeed, Roosevelt had determined not to
make a full public disclosure of what transpired at Yalta. 8 Roosevelt, fully
aware of this sentiment, decided to make Byrnes his advance man. Having
Byrnes immediately on the scene would help insure sanguine reporting by
the press and a more favorable response from Congress.
By no means, however, did Byrnes anticipate a hostile audience.
Neither before Yalta began nor after the communique was issued did Congress or the public express major opposition. Apart from the concern about
censorship and lack of Congressional involvement, only the most extreme
Roosevelt critics reacted negatively. When the communique was read in
Congress it met with protracted cheers. Byrnes cabled Roosevelt: "Communique received with great approval by Congress and Press.'' A small, but
vocal, Republican minority felt differently. The New Republic observed:
"The American isolationist and protoisolationist press, like the Hearst and
Scripps-Howard chains and the Chicago Tribune are howling their heads
off at the results of the conference, their main [idea] being that Russia won
an overwhelming victory over the Western Allies." On the other hand,
Commonweal exemplifying the viewpoint of the liberal press, said of one of
the most controversial agreements: "The settlement of the Polish question,
though departing from absolute justice is probably as good a settlement as
we could expect." 9
Byrnes' mission upon returning from Yalta was not, then, to answer
major objections to the Yalta accords, but rather to smooth the way for
Congressional and public approval, while preempting charges of further administration secrecy. Byrnes also needed to blunt the general concern that in
matters of diplomacy the United States was capable of being outfoxed.
Before the Conference concluded, James Reston put his finger on the
popular fear of being "hornswoggled" at Yalta as America had in previous
international meetings. 10 In addition, the public felt uneasy about the possible dominance of Stalin. Russian military victories involving incredible
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losses put him in an awesome position to negotiate a favorable agreement.
It was for Byrnes to convince the American public that Roosevelt, not Stalin,
had dominated the Conference.
Byrnes opened the press conference with characteristic affableness. He
joked about Russian vodka, calling it "new corn," and about the White
House conference room which Byrnes saw as "this funeral parlor with
Hollywood parentage." After exchanging pleasantries with the press,
Byrnes turned immediately to emphasize the dominant role the President
had played at the Conference: "Without any formal vote, but by
aquiesence, he was chairman of the conference. He displayed great skill,
great tact, great patience, and good humor; and more than once by that tact
and good humor he brought about decisions." Byrnes also pointed out that
Roosevelt had proposed the Declaration of Liberated Europe which, he
claimed, insured tripartite allied participation in the reestablishment of
governments in Greece, Poland, and Yugoslavia. But, as Robert Messer has
noted, the original declaration was watered down in the give and take of
negotiation and became little more than an agreement to consult.'' Compounding the problem, Byrnes erroneously made it appear that the settlement of the Polish question was representative of the disposition of other
liberated countries. The Big Three had agreed to provide for free elections
in Poland. Indeed, Roosevelt had tried to establish Poland as a precedent,
but ultimately this link was never forged. 12
To lend further credence to the claim that Roosevelt had led the Conference, Byrnes heralded the news that he had authored the voting formula
to be used in the Security Council of the United Nations Organization. He
guarded, however, the formula's particulars at the request of Harry
Hopkins, the President's adviser, who cabled him the day before. 13 One
reason for secrecy was simply that China and France had first to be invited
as Security Council participants. However, there were other reasons.
Although Stalin had been made to agree to the Security Council voting formula, he had prevailed on another sensitive issue. Roosevelt had acquiesed
to Stalin's demand to have two Soviet Republics in addition to the U.S.S.R.
represented in the General Assembly. This Byrnes did not reveal. Nor did he
admit that the voting formula gave the right of veto to the Great Powers.
Byrnes was remarkably successful in making Roosevelt appear to have
held his own at Yalta. The New York Times report of Byrnes' press conference focused specifically on Roosevelt's role in shaping what Byrnes
presented as two of the major agreements. Less than a week later Newsweek
concluded: "The decisions reached [at Yalta] did not reflect any domination of the meeting by the Soviet Premier .... And if any of the Big Three
might be said to have made more impression on the results than the other
two, that man was the President." 1•
Among the Yalta agreements discussed in the communique and explained by Byrnes, the settlement of the Polish question caused the greatest
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stir m Congress. According to the Yalta communique, the Curzon line
would become the boundary between the Soviet Union and Poland, and a
new provisional government would be formed from the Polish government
exiled in London and the Soviet supported Lublin National Committee.
The new government would be committed to holding free elections. Byrnes
structured his response to the press interrogation on the Polish question to
emphasize the favorable aspects of the compromise: free elections would be
held, and the London government would be represented. 1 ' An editorial in
the New York Times had referred to the Polish settlement as a compromise.
To this charge Byrnes responed that because the Soviets had liberated
Poland, a compromise was inevitable, which, indeed, it was. When the
press informed Byrnes that the London Poles had refused to accept the
settlement, he responded untactfully: "I didn't read that, but if they did,
how many of them are there?" 16 Although risking the irritation of PolishAmericans, this was perhaps the only statement Byrnes made which
reflected honestly the tenuous position of the Polish government in exile.
Otherwise, Byrnes colored the Polish agreements with an optimism which
the Soviet military presence in Poland and her historic interest in having
friendly buffer states largely contradicted. The Polish settlement expressed
in the communique was little more than an agreement to allow a commission of the Big Three to consult with the Lublin government and the London
Poles to determine how the goals were to be accomplished. Since, as
Norman Graebner notes, the Americans did not plan to go to war with
Russia over Poland, there was no means of assuring what the fate of Poland
would be and every reason to believe it would not be favorable to American
interests. 11
In addressing the Polish question and other vital matters raised at
Yalta, Byrnes made it difficult for the press to distinguish between personal
and official interpretation. While on one hand Byrnes frequently showed
his dependence on the language of the Yalta communique, on the other, he
also brought a highly idiosyncratic perspective to the accords. The press, for
their part, credited Byrnes with a greater understanding of what had occurred
than was reasonable. This is not surprising. Byrnes had made his role seem
extremely important and Roosevelt had, after all, authorized Brynes to tell
the story first. While Byrnes knew too little about foreign policy or the context of the negotiations to make an accurate statement, the press, hungry
for some word of Yalta, invested too much faith in him. Byrnes's contributions to public misunderstanding of the communique rested on emphasis
and tone, through which he made the agreements appear far more promising than they actually were. Roosevelt was delighted with the reports of
Byrnes' press conference. Still en route from Yalta, he cabled Byrnes: "We
are a day out and the trip has been excellent thus far. I think your press conferences have been grand.""
Byrnes' part in selling Yalta did not end with a single White House
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press conference. On the day the communique was to be released he brought
advance copies to a group of Republican and Democratic senators. Later,
after the press conference, he met again with influential senators including
William Fulbright and Burton Wheeler to discuss the Yalta meeting. He
spent nearly two hours recounting its details. Even isolationist Wheeler,
reported Time, "seemed impressed if not satisfied with what he heard."
Within a week of his return from Yalta, Byrnes is said to have spoken with
three-fourths of the Senate and a good number of House members. He also
narrated a newsreel on the Yalta Conference. In the wake of his rhetorical
campaign, columnist Ernest K. Lindley reflected: "He is one of the most
persuasive men in Washington.'" 9
In light of later developments Byrnes' hand in making Yalta platable to
Congress and the nation is ironic. Indeed, it posed a political problem for
Byrnes. Almost as soon as Byrnes returned home, concern about secret
agreements reached at Yalta was expressed by several Republican Congressmen and the Chicago Tribune. In February 1945 Byrnes told the press
nothing about the Far Eastern agreements. He could not have, since they
were concluded after he left. Initially, the Far Eastern agreements were not
publicly revealed to guard against Japan's learning of Russia's intention to
enter the war against her. But when Roosevelt died, and Byrnes became
Truman's Secretary of State, he participated in keeping the agreements
secret six months beyond the Japanese surrender on August 14, 1945. They
were not made public until February 11, 1946. Byrnes, who knew of the
agreements upon becoming Secretary of State, denied knowledge of their
existence after there was no military justification for secrecy because the
Truman administration did not want to be bound by the Yalta accords. 20
Consequently, in a September 4 press conference, Byrnes refused to
discuss the Far Eastern agreements. In August the Soviets demanded cession of the Kurile Islands and South Sahkalin. Reporters asked Byrnes if
any agreements on these strategic Pacific islands had been reached at the
Potsdam Conference. He replied that the islands had been discussed at
Yalta, not Postddam, but when pressed further said: "Well, I don't want to
get into that conference. I remember the discussion very well at the time,
but I don't want to discuss it now." 2 1
In the space of just two months Byrnes's memory grew much dimmer.
In November Ambassador to China, Patrick Hurley, resigned claiming
communist and imperialist influence in the State Department. The next
month the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held confidential hearings
to investigate Hurley's charges. Byrnes was called to testify on Yalta, since
Hurley had not attended. When Senator Styles Bridges asked Byrnes directly
if any agreements had been reached at Yalta concerning China, Byrnes
could not remember any such agreements, though admitting some
agreements may have been reached. 22
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The issue of the Far Eastern agreements did not surface again until late
January. A publicized disagreement between Dean Acheson and the Soviet
Union over the permanence of the Soviet military occupation of the Kuriles
led Byrnes to clarify the matter in a January 29 press conference. Responding to reporters' questions, Byrnes maintained that he did not know of the
agreements because he returned from Yalta before they were reached and
did not learn of them until after the Japanese surrender in August 1945. In
an off-the-record aside Byrnes stroked the press by reminding them that in
the September 4 news conference he had frankly admitted to have
"learned" of the agreements. In fact, he had said he remembered the
discussion of the Kurile Islands from the Yalta Conference. Although this is
improbable since he did not attend the final Yalta session at which the Far
East was discussed, there is proof that Byrnes knew of the Far Eastern
agreements as early as July 3, 1945. 23
In an effort to make his claimed ignorance of the agreements more
plausible, Byrnes said he had been unable to locate the text in the State
Department archives, discovering it finally among Roosevelt's personal
papers at the White House. Thus, he gave the impression that the
agreements were ones which Roosevelt had arrived at with Churchill and
Stalin secretly, and had kept secret even from the State Deaprtment. Byrnes
admitted only that the American Chiefs of Staff knew of it. In the late forties and early fifties Roosevelt's critics would use Byrnes' rhetorical dodges
to document the President's alleged secret sell-out of American interests at
Yalta. 2 •
Of course, this is not to say that Byrnes anticipated how the critics of
Roosevelt would use his remarks. Indeed, they interpreted Byrnes freely.
Remarkably, one Republican Senator, William Langer, maintained that
Roosevelt had entered into the Far Eastern agreements without Byrnes, his
Secretary of State, in attendance, forgetting that Stettinius, not Byrnes, had
held the post during the Yalta Conference. Although Byrnes' actual
statements were not as damning as Roosevelt critics later remembered, it
seems clear that Byrnes had his own interests in mind when he made them. 25
In his revealing study of these events Athan Theoharis concludes that
Byrnes' indictment of Roosevelt's secret diplomacy at Yalta stemmed from
a desire to justify both his evasiveness during the Hurley Hearings and the
Truman-Byrnes administration's decision to conceal the Far Eastern
agreements. While true, this analysis is not complete . It must be
remembered that in February 1945, Byrnes had enthusiastically endorsed
the Yalta accords as Roosevelt's agent. He had gathered Congressional and
public support, in his press conference, in private meetings with Congressional leaders, and even in a newsreel. Byrnes' rhetoric had publicly committed him to support of Yalta. Acting as the President's emissary had
helped establish Byrnes, the domestic politician, as an important figure in
foreign policy. He had made the most of the political opportunity Roosevelt

provided by presenting himself as an important and informed Conference
participant. In September, despite the Truman administration's decision to
postpone publication of the Far Eastern agreements, he did not want to
diminish his importance at Yalta, and therefore claimed to have
remembered the discussion of South Sahkalin and the Kurile Islands. Simply
to admit in January 1946 that the President had excluded him from the final
Conference session in which the Far Eastern agreements were forged would
have suggested that Roosevelt had taken him along for political rather than
diplomatic reasons. In February 1945, Byrnes had specifically denied this
suggestion. It was convenient, then, for Byrnes to imply in January 1946
that Roosevelt had reached some agreements secretly, perhaps even without
the State Department's knowledge . Of course, this justification also served
to explain why he did not learn of the agreements until after the Japanese
surrender, rather than when he became Secretary of State, and why he had
been reticent about them during the Hurley Hearings
Byrnes' insistence on having been a prominent delegate at Yalta,
whether from pride or political opportunism, and his willingness to play out
the role Roosevelt intended for him threatened to damage his credibility.
While Byrnes' evasion on the Far Eastern agreements may have been dictated by foreign policy decisions of the Truman administration, his fear of
losing credibility with both the Senate and the public also shaped his
rhetoric. In the interests of resolving inconsistencies in his public statements
from February through December 1945, Byrnes sold-out Roosevelt as deftly
as he had sold Yalta .
As d;tente fades into a new era of Cold War the clock seems to turn
backward. Poland is again a cause celebre in Eastern Europe and charges of
imperialism are hurled across the iron curtain with renewed vigor. In these
times it is instructive to remember that the war fought with propaganda
rather than bullets had its genesis in misperceptions rather than truths. Jimmy
Byrnes contributed to forming these misperceptions. Had Byrnes sold Yalta
more realistically, had he revealed the Far Eastern agreements earlier and
said nothing to sow the seeds of Republican suspicion of Roosevelt's Yalta
diplomacy there would still have been a Cold War. Nevertheless, an
understanding of Byrnes' role in framing public perceptions of Yalta
testifies to the importance of personal motivation in the creation of a
rhetoric with far-reaching public consequences .
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